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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia - July 27, 1982 
SECTION TWO 
1. Smith, re.alizing he was going to need firewood to heat 
his home in Albemarle County, Virginia, during the winter months, 
entered into an oral agreement with Wood on October 19, 1978, by 
which Wood agreed to deliver five cords of choice oak to Smith on 
or before November 1, 1978, at an agreed price of $400. At the time 
of the agreement, Smith carefully explained to Wood that he, Smith, 
was unable to heat his home other than by oak firewood because he 
had an ext~eme and serious aller~y to all other types of heating 
fuel. Wood assured Smith that he understood Smith's problem and 
that he would deliver the wood to Smith as agreed. Because of person-
al difficulties, Wood did not deliver the firewood and Smith made 
every reasonable effort to obtain firewood elsewhere, but there 
having been an unusually heavy demand for the same due to the high 
cost of other fuels, he was unable to locate and purchase any. Since 
he could use no other fuel, Smith was forced to move to Key West, 
Florida, where he resided during the cold winter months of January 
and February of 1979 at a cost of $2,000 over his normal living 
expense. 
Smith consults Lawyer on May 8, 1982, and asks: 
(a) Does he have aJcause of action against Wood that can be 
successfully maintained at this time? 
(b) Would your answer be different if the agreement had been 
in writing? 
(c) What are the usual elements of damages in cases of this 
* * * * * 
2. On January 5, 1982, John Byer, a resident of Christians-
Virginia, was on his way to Morgantown, West Virginia, to 
see a basketball game scheduled for that evening when he was in-
volved in a railroad crossing accident in Mercer County, West Vir-
ginia. The automobile being driven by Byer was struck by a locomo-
tive of the Danville and Ohio Railway Company at a grade crossing 
of the highway upon which Byer was traveling. Byer recejved serious 
· personal injuries as a result of the accident and was removed to 
Bluefield Mercy Hospital for the treatment of his injuries. The 
morning after the accident, an investigator for the Railway Company 
obtained a signed, written statement from Byer wherein he stated 
that his attention was diverted by two bird dogs on point in a field 
adjacent to the highway and he failed to notice the approaching 
train as he approached the grade crossing. A few days later, Byer 
died from the injuries which he had received in the accident. 
On May 20, 1982, the Administrator of Eyer's estate brought 
an action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Virginia, 
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against the Railway Company ~eeking the recovery of damages for 
Byer's wrongful death. 
At the trial of the case, the evidence clearly established 
that .the Railway Company had not protected the grade crossing with 
any type of crossing protection device and had failed to give any 
signal on approaching the grade crossing where the accident occur-
red, and that such omission contributed to the accident. A pedes-
trian near the crossing testified that he saw the accident and that 
Byer was driving at an excessive rate of speed as he approached 
the crossing and was unable to stop his car before it entered the 
Railway crossing in front of the train. In order to establish addi-
~ional negligence on Byer's part, the Railway Company sought to 
.introduce the written statement which Byer had signed on the day 
following the accident at the i~stance of the Railway investigator. 
Virginia has a statute which provides that if the operator of 
~ny railroad engine or train fails to give the signals required by 
law on approaching a grade crossing of a public highway which is not 
protected by any type of crossing protection device, the fact that a 
,traveler on such highway failed to exercise due care in approaching 
such crossing shall not bar recovery for injury to, or death of, 
such traveler. Under the law of West Virginia, contributory negli-
is an absolute bar to recovery. · 
, Virginia also has a statute which provides that iti an actibn 
by or against a person who, from any cause, is incapable of testify-
ing, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor, administra-
tor, heir or other representative of a person so incapable of testi-
·'fying, no uncorroborated ex parte statement such as that executed by 
Byer is admissible in evidence. Under the law of West Virginia, 
~yer's statement would be admissible in evidence. 
When Eyer's statement was offered in evidence, the attorney 
for his estate objected on the ground that its admission was in 
violation of the Virginia statute and the Court sustained his objec-
tion. 
...•. When both sides had rested their cases, the attorney for 
~Byer's estate moved the Court to enter summary judgment against 
Fhe Railway Company and submit the case to the jury upon the sole 
'question of damages because of its failure to give the statutory 
signals of its approach to the grade crossing which was not supplied 
with proper warning devices, to which motion the attorney for the 
Railway Company immediately objected. 
(a) Did the Court err in refusing to admit Bye~'s written 
statement in evidence? 
(b) How should the Court rule on the motion of Eyer's Adminis-
,trator for summary judgment? 
* * * * * 
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3. On June 10; 1982, Ebenezer Appleby was called by the trea-
surer's office of his employer, Magnum Industries, and informed that 
$750 was being withheld from his salary to satisfy a summons in 
garnishment served under a judgment obtained against him in the 
General District Court of the City of Virgini~ Beach, Virginia on 
April 11, 1982 by the Nd Loss Loan Co. of that City. Appleby had 
never borrowed money from No Loss and was completely unaware of 
any judgment against him. 
Upon investigation, Appleby discovered that his 19 year old 
son, Sylvester, feeling a compelling need for suitable transporta-
tion, had borrowed $1,000 from No Loss to buy a car. He obtained 
the loan largely on the strength of the forged endorsement of his 
-father, Ebenezer. After paying ~250 on the loan, Sylvester default-
.ed, and No Loss filed suit against him and against Ebenezer on the 
endorsement. Ebenezer was away from his home in Virginia Beach on 
business when the Sheriff attempted personal service, but substitut-
, ed service was made on Sylvester as an adult member of Ebenezer's 
family. Sylvester never told Ebenezer about the loan, the service 
• of process or the subsequent ~ourt hearing where judgment was obtain-
ed by No Loss against Sylvester (who had no assets) and against 
his father Ebenezer. 
Ebenezer then related the foregoing to White Knight, the fam-
ily lawyer, who promptly filed a bill in equity in the Circ~it Court 
of Virginia Beach seeking an order setting aside the judgment which 
had been obtained by No Loss, and restraining the loan company from 
making any further attempts to collect the debt from Ebenezer. Just 
as promptly, Larry Literal, counsel for No Loss, filed a demurrer 
on the ground that the service of process and judgment were regular 
on their face and could not be set aside without an allegation of 
fraud by No Loss. How should the Court rule on the demurrer? 
* * * * * 
4. Henry Adams, a resident of Norfolk, Virginia, died testate, 
on November 7, 1974. He was survived by his sister, Jane and her 
three sons, Robert (age 12), Thomas (age 16) and Harold (age 21). 
His will, duly admitted to probate, contained the following provi-
sion: 
"I give my cottage, at Oceanfront and 69th Street, 
Virginia Beach, Virginia, to my sister, Jane, for 
her lifetime, and after the decease of my sister, 
I give the cottage in fee simple to her eldest son." 
Jane died on December 3, 1981, survived by Robert and Thomas, 
as Harold and his wife had died intestate in May of 1978 as the 
result of a tragic automobile accident, shortly after the birth 
of their only child, Ellen. 
Thomas sought your advice as to who took the cottage under 
the terms of Henry's will. How should you advise h1m? 
* * * * * 
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5. f-0m Blake, ~widower residing in Franklin, Virginia died 
on May 3, 1980. By his will, duly admitted to probate, he bequeathed 
all of his property to his son, Tim. One half of the property passed 
outright to Tim and the other half was to be held by Tim in trust 
to be used in the Trustee's sole discretion for the use and benefit 
of Tim's older sister, Violet, who was in poor health. Upon Violet's 
death the trust was to terminate with the unexpended corpus and 
any undistributed income to pass to Tim absolutely. 
Tim and Violet frequently disagreed on a number of things 
and one of them was in the nature and extent of the medical treat-
ment which was appropriate for Violet's physical condition. After 
a particularly heated discussion, in which Tim refused to pay for 
elective therapy which Violet very much wanted to have, Violet call-
ed you, as her attorney, and complained bitterly of Tim's actions 
as Trustee. She described additional examples of an existing and 
constant friction between Tim and herself, and stated that she sus-
pected that Tim was influenced by a conflicting personal interest 
in the trust fund. She asked whether Tim could be removed as Trust-
ee. How should you advise Vioi~t? 
* * * * * 
6. Robert Barker, a duly licensed Virginia lawyer was .trying 
to establish his practice in Richmond, Virginia. A friend introduced 
him to Samuel Standard who operated Commerce House, a collection 
agency located in Richmond. Standard told Barker that he would be 
glad to refer to him the collection accounts of some of Standard's 
customers. Standard explained that he handled a very large number 
of collection accounts and found it most expeditious for all commun-
ications from the creditors to be referred to the lawyer through · 
the collection agency. Standard explained that upon referring a 
claim to Barker he wanted the attorney to write the debtor a letter 
on his iaw office stationery requesting payment by a given date, 
and stating that Barker would file suit to collect the debt if no 
such payment was received. Standard would keep Barker fully advised 
of any information received from the creditor. 
Barker had never worked with a collection agency and came to 
your office to seek your wise counsel. Should you advise Barker 
to enter into such a relationship or not? 
* * * * * 
7. Sam Slick was the Treasurer, one of five directors and 
a 5% stockholder of Acme Construction Co., a Virginia Corporation 
with its principal office in Roanoke. The company has twenty-eight 
stockholders, all of whom live in the Roanoke area. Last year Acme's 
income dropped $500,000 below the previous year's income. 
A trade association of which the company was a member held 
a convention in New York City and all five directors attended. The 
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purpose of the meeting was to solicit c~ntributio~s for political 
activity to boost the fortunes of the depressed construction in-
dustry. There was no doubt but that such contributions and the polit-
ical activity which they would support would be entirely lawful. 
While in New York, the chairman of the board of directors called 
a meeting of the board in his hotel room to consider whether the 
company should contribute corporate funds to the proposed campaign. 
Sam and the four other directors attended and waived formal 
notice of the meeting, and the chairman then opened the meeting 
for business. After expressing himself strongly opposed to making 
a contribution, Sam excused himself from the meeting and went to 
a baseball game at Yankee Stadium. Thecremaining directors, who 
for some time had felt that Sam was not showing much interest in 
the affairs of the company, took the following actions: 
(1) They voted to contribute $10,000 of the company's money 
the trade association's fund drive. 
(2) They voted to remove Sam as a director of the company. 
(3) They elected John Imwithit as Treasurer and terminated 
employment as a corporate officer. 
(4) They changed the company's name to Roanoke Progressiv~ 
Construction Co. 
When Sam returned from the ball game he was furious. Upon 
return to Roanoke he sued the company and the four directors. 
He alleged that all of the actions taken by the directors were 
invalid since (a) the Board could not hold a meeting in New York, 
(b) the Board had no authority to remove him as a director, (c) 
his removal as Treasurer had not been preceded by any notice or 
warning, (d) the City of Roanoke had not consented to the change 
of the company's name, and (e) the contribution to the trade associ-
ation was a waste of corporate assets. Ass~ming that neither the 
charter nor the by-laws alter Virginia corporate law, how should 
the Court rule on each of these five points? 
* * * * * 
8. John and Mary Smith, residents of Virginia, borrowed 
$10,000 from a local lending institution for a term of five years. 
The Smiths signed a promissory note for $10,000 made payable to 
bearer, and providing for interest only payments each month, with 
the full principal balance due in five years. They secured the 
loan with a deed of trust on their house which provided the remedy 
of foreclosure upon default of any payment not made fifteen days 
after it was due. As part of the transaction the borrowers and 
the lender signed a separate loan agreement which said in part 
that at the end of five years John and Mary could renew the loan 
for an additional five years at an interest rate equal to the prime 
rate then being charged by a certain bank in New York. The note 
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and deed of trust, read and signed by John and his wife, were on 
standard printed forms prepared by the lender and made no reference 
to the separate loan agreement and contained no extension clauses. 
After two years the lending institution fell on hard times 
and sold at a discount and delivered John and Mary's note to Acme 
Bank in Richmond. The lending institution, however, did not endorse 
the note. John and Mary were notified that the note transfer had 
occurred and were instructed to make all further payments to Acme 
Bank, which they did. 
Two days before the five years were up, John and Mary went 
to Acme Bank to renew their note only to be told that the bank 
had decided not to renew any of its loans secured by real estate 
and that the principal balance would be due and payable in two 
days. The bank disclaimed any knowledge of the separate loan agree-
ment. The original institution had gone out of business and all 
of its records were destroyed. John produced a signed copy of the 
loan agreement and demanded that his loan be renewed. How would 
you advise the bank with respect to John's demand? 
9. Donna Donor died in 1981 leaving a $5,000 bequest to her 
daughter, Denise. The remainder of her estate consisting of va~ious 
stocks and bonds was placed in a Residuary Trust, income and princi-
pal payable, at the discretion of the Trustee, for the benefit 
of Denise. 
In 1981 Denise received the $5,000 bequest. The following 
year, the various stocks and bonds held by the Trustee earned divi-
dend and interest income totaling $10,000. During that same year, 
$7,000 of the income was distributed to Denise. 
What are the federal income tax consequences of the foregoing 
to (a) the trust and (b) Denise? 
10. On a hot and lazy August afternoon in 1980 the mayor of 
the City of Westville, Virginia was driving a city owned vehicle 
from City Hall to inspect the city dump when he struck Clara Clear-
ly' s vehicle in the rear while she was stopped at a traffic light. 
Immediately before the collision he had glanced to his left to 
inspect a newly planted flower bed in a City park. 
Clara went to the hospital where she later was discharged 
with a diagnosis of "Whiplash-mild." The City police investigated 
the accident, filed a traffic report but placed no charges. Clara 
thought nothing further of the matter because she was about to 
depart for a year's study in France when the accident happened. 
Her departure was delayed for three weeks by the accident but she 
finally left on Labor Day to take up her studies. Unfortunately 
while in France her injury grew worse and she was forced to return 
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home before completing her studies. Medical expenses began to pile 
up so she wrote the City a letter on April 1 stating her problem 
and advising that unless they paid her $2,000 by April 15th she 
would file suit. Hearing nothing on that date she filed a personal 
inju~y action against the City and against the mayor personally. 
Does either the Mayor or the City have any defenses to 
Clara's claim despite the Mayor's neglig,ence? 
